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I. Introduction*
Together with some Latin American countries, Korea represented
one of the world's major borrowers, before it began to reduce
foreign indebtedness recently. Nevertheless remarkable differen-
ces exist with regard to the structure of capital inflows. Since
1965 Korea attracted foreign capital nearly exclusively in the
form of debt. The debt/GNP ratio peaked at 53.5 per cent in 1982
(Collins, Park, 1987a, p. '4) . Inflows of foreign direct invest-
ment (fdi) remained negligible (Table Al) . Consequently, the
ratio of fdi-stocks over the stock of fdi plus debt was extremely
low in Korea, amounting to 3 per cent in 1983. Substantially
higher ratios were recorded for other major debtors such as Bra-
zil (20 per cent), Chile (17 per cent), and Mexico (13 per cent)
(Corsepius, 1988a, p. 37). Again in sharp contrast to Latin
American countries, high external indebtedness went along with
favourable economic performance in Korea. During the 1965-1986
period, the average economic growth rate amounted to 8.6 per
cent.
Both observations, i.e., the exceptional structure of external
financing and the favourable economic performance, may in fact be
interrelated . This hypothesis refers to a choice-theoretic model
which analyzes the international transfer of capital on the basis
of an agent-principal approach. It is shown that transfer negoti-
ations between foreign lenders or investors (principals) and the
authorities in the recipient country (agent) can result in a
first-best "cooperative" or second-best "non-cooperative" equi-
librium (Lachler, 1985). The impact of capital inflows on econo-
mic performance of the recipient country depends on which of both
regimes is realized. In a non-cooperative situation, the borrower
fails to precommit himself credibly to a certain investment be-
haviour. Under such conditions, the choice between equity and
Similar studies on the relation between the external financing
structure and economic performance were undertaken for Chile
and Mexico (Corsepius, 1988a; 1988b).
* Support from Peter Nunnenkamp is gratefully acknowledged.
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debt finance may involve a risk-return trade-off between income
stability and expected growth. A higher proportion of equity
inflows reduces the variability of the agent's domestic absorpti-
on. At the same time, the incentives to generate and invest do-
mestic savings are supposed to be weaker than in the case of debt
finance. Consequently, future growth prospects are diminished.
The non-cooperative situation has been considered as typical for
the recent past (LSchler/Nunnenkamp, 1987) . However, some agents
may have succeeded to engage in cooperative relations with for-
eign principals. Korea may provide a case in point. Whether or
not a cooperative solution is reached ultimately depends on the
terms for debt and fdi transfers which are set by the principal.
But the agent can influence the principal's decision by signal-
ling that he is prepared to engage in cooperative relations. The
institutional framework governing the allocation and use of for-
eign funds is likely to play a prominent role in this respect. In
the case of Korea, the publicly enforced orientation towards
investment and exports may have rendered the principals confident
about the country's willingness and ability to guarantee an ef-
ficient use of transferred funds. The favourable economic per-
formance of Korea may then be attributable to cooperative terms
of capital transfers, i.e., better terms than granted to the bulk
of developing countries.
Government interventions may not only influence the terms of
capital inflows. They also affect the structural composition of
resource inflows. Moreover, government interventions may have a
direct impact on the growth effects of different capital inflows
insofar as the model assumptions on the investment behaviour of
the agents are modified. In the case of Korea, this factor can be
expected to be of utmost importance. The Korean economy is highly
regulated although it is frequently considered as a market econo-
my. Financial market regulations have been a major instrument in
government allocation policies.
In the following, the predictions of the principal-agent model on
the effects of different capital inflows on economic performance
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in Korea are subjected to an empirical test. Section II outlines
the choice-theoretic model and clarifies whether transfer nego-
tiations yielded a cooperative or non-cooperative equilibrium in
the case of Korea. Chapter III analyzes how Korean policies af-
fected the structure of capital inflows over the 1973-1987 period
and discusses the effects of regulations on the investment behav-
iour of the agent. In Section IV the impact of different types of
capital inflows on key macroeconomic variables is tested empiri-
cally. The results are interpreted within the agent-principal
framework. In the final chapter the summary of the analysis un-
dertaken in this paper leads to some policy conclusions.
II. Theoretical Framework
1. The Basic Model
The relationship between foreign financing and domestic savings
and investment is the subject of a long debate in the literature
on development finance. Most empirical studies concluded that an
additional Dollar of foreign capital increases total savings by
less than one Dollar . Research focused on distinguishing the
effects of private versus public transfers and aid versus non-
concessional external finance. The distinction between debt and
fdi which figures prominently in the following principal-agent
model was typically neglected.
In the underlying model (Lachler 1985; Lachler, Nunnenkamp,
1987), the capital transfer between foreign lenders and investors
(principals) and the recipient country (agent) is typically char-
acterized by an informational assymetry: Once the money is trans-
ferred, the principal does not know which proportion the agent
invests in income-generating activities. He merely observes total
For an overview of empirical studies which measured the effects
of foreign capital on domestic savings, domestic investment and
economic growth, see Sharma (1983).
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output which is not only a function of realized investment but
also of random variables. As the agent allocates the transferred
resources between consumption and investment the following dis-
incentive (moral hazard) problems arise:
- In the case of equity participation, the agent can be expected
to invest a smaller share of domestic absorption compared to a
situation where foreign resources are available as a gift.
Since the principal is entitled to a predetermined share of
future output, the agent may improve his own welfare position
by shifting domestic absorption to current consumption.
- In the case of debt finance, the principal is entitled to a
fixed sum of debt service payments. Relative to a gift-transfer
the agent will then choose riskier projects. It is favourable
for the agent to raise the variance of returns from investments
in order to maximize his own welfare at the expense of the
principal.
Moral hazard of the agent threatens to reduce the expected gains
of the principal. Assuming that principals behave rationally,
they anticipate the agent's behaviour and modify the terms under
which the transfer is made. The agent who receives foreign capi-
tal under these harder conditions is then forced to a non-co-
operative investment behaviour.
The aforementioned disincentive problems may be overcome, if the
agent was able to precommit himself credibly to a certain in-
vestment behaviour. In such a cooperative environment the model
hypothesizes that the investment response (I) to a transfer (T)
obeys the following pattern:
(1) dI/dT| £ (dI/dT| , dI/dT| ) , with 0 S dI/dT| S 1
AID EQUITY DEBT AID
According to (1) , the recipient country invests a relatively
larger share if the transfer involves future repayment obliga-
tions. However, if the transfer negotiations result in a non-co-
operative solution the change in domestic investment after an
increased equity inflow may be negative, while more external debt
always leads to more investment. Under non-cooperative conditions
the following pattern is expected:
(2) dI/dT| £ dI/dT| S dI/dT| with 0 £ dI/dT| S I
EQUITY AID » DEBT AID
The pattern of coefficient values - as given in (1) and (2) for
investment - is supposed to hold for changes in economic growth
and domestic savings (DS) in response to increased transfers as
well. Real economic growth is assumed to be a stochastic function
of investment. The response of domestic savings to aid inflows is
bounded by:
-1 ^ dDS/dT| S O 1 .
AID
2. The Transfer Negotiations in the Case of Korea
Since the economic performance effects of capital inflows depend
on the outcome of transfer negotiations, it is necessary to get
an idea if Korea has to be characterized as a cooperative or a
non-cooperative case. The model suggests that the agent may
signal that he is prepared to engage in cooperative relations. A
high investment ratio, successful mobilization of domestic sav-
ings and the use of funds according to the country's comparative
advantage may provide such indicators, which ensure the principal
that his funds are invested productively rather than consumed.
Ultimately it depends on the terms at which the principal is
willing to transfer capital to the agent whether or not a co-
operative equilibrium is reached.
This results from the definition of domestic savings which is
DS = I - T.
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The crucial role of high investments for economic growth was
stressed in all Korean Five-Year Plans since 1962 (Collins/Park,
1987a, p. 15). Reflecting this policy goal, the investment ratio
averaged 27.1 per cent during the 1965-1985 period, compared with
23.6 per cent for all developing countries (data from IMF, 1987) .
Temporary plunges of domestic savings were compensated by foreign
borrowing in order to fill the gap between desired investment and
available domestic savings . Moreover, despite these plunges, a
remarkable secular rise in the savings ratio can be observed, and
government savings remained positive since 1962. In 1986 the
savings ratio even outpaced the high investment ratio. There can
thus be no doubt that, concerning the criterion of high invest-
ment and mobilization of domestic savings, Korea behaved in a
cooperative manner.
The picture is less straightforward with regard to the riskiness
of investments. After promoting exports of labour-intensive manu-
factures, the government favoured heavy and chemical industries
in the 1973-1979 period, most of which are known as skill and
technology-intensive (Park, 1976, p.' 1028). The heavy industri-
alization program granted preferential access to financial funds
and reinforced import protection for privileged sectors. As a
consequence, heavy industries characterized by high loan/value
added ratios and low gross rates of return expanded as strongly
as labour-intensive industries during the 1971-1982 period
(Hong/Park, 1986, pp. 168-172).
The strong focus on heavy industrialization was probably in con-
flict with Korea's comparative advantages. Nevertheless the boom
of Korean exports continued; exports soared by an average of 39.6
per cent annually in the 1973-1979 period (Collins/Park, 1987a,
pp. 9, 11). Export promotion which was a major goal of government
policy in Korea since the first Five-Year Plan continued to be of
This was especially true in 1974/75 and 1979/80, i.e., after
the two oil price shocks. During the whole period 1965-1986,
the investment ratio showed a smaller standard deviation than
the savings ratio although its mean was substantially higher.
This underlines that high and stable investments were of first
priority.
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high priority. Table A2 shows that privileged access to credits
represented a major instrument of export promotion in the 1970s.
Additionally, interest rates on loans to export oriented indus-
tries were substantially lower than for domestic market oriented
industries . Arguably, foreign principals referred to favourable
export conditions and the strong world market performance in the
first place when assessing the riskiness of their engagement in
Korea. Consequently cooperative terms would have been granted
notwithstanding the risk-increasing reorientation in economic
policies towards heavy and chemical industries.
Actually, the average costs of foreign loans to Korea were con-
siderably lower than for other developing countries. This is
evident from information on interest rate spreads over LIBOR
which indicate the lender's (principal's) risk assessment, i.e.,
whether or not cooperative terms are granted. In the period 1976
to 1984, average interest rate spreads amounted to 1.02 percent-
age points for Korea, compared with 1.2 0 percentage points for a
sample of 21 developing countries and 1.35 percentage points for
nine major problem borrowers (Nunnenkamp/Junge, 1985, p. 57).
Spreads were relatively high in Korea in 1976 (1.92 percentage
points, compared with 1.8 percentage points for all developing
countries) which may indicate that lenders were aware of the
riskiness of the promotion of heavy and chemical industries.
Subsequently, however, spreads declined substantially. In 1984,
only marginal differences in spreads prevailed between Korea and
major industrial countries (0.65 versus 0.61 percentage points).
All in all, there are strong indications that principal-agent
relationships can be considered as cooperative in the case of Ko-
rea. Therefore, the investment response of external finance is
expected to obey the pattern of equation (1) rather than equation
(2).
Differences in ratios of total (domestic and foreign) loans
over total assets between these two sectors ranged from 2.5 to
16.9 percentage points. The maximal difference in average costs
of borrowing was 5 percentage points.
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III. Government Policies and Capital Inflows
1. The Relevance of the Regulative Framework
The predictions of the principal-agent model refer to the effects
of different capital inflows on investment in the first place.
Since economic growth is portrayed as a stochastic function of
investment the growth effects of external finance are supposed to
follow the pattern of equation (1) as well. Implicitly it is
assumed that all investments are equally efficient. Foreign capi-
tal inflows are considered as perfectly fungible (Lachler, 1985) .
Once the transfers are made the government agent can dispose of
those funds for either consumption or investment purposes.
Actually the government's leverage to determine the use and thus
the efficiency of foreign capital inflows may differ between the
various types of external finance. The government agent can
freely dispose of resources directly transferred to him and imme-
diately determine the efficiency of foreign aid and public debt
for example. The efficiency of fdi and private debt inflows can
only be influenced indirectly by the government, even though the
public guidance of the private sector is fairly strong as was the
case in Korea. Government regulations may modify the incentives
of the recipients of foreign capital as to how to use the resour-
ces transferred. Moreover, the strong involvement of the Korean
government in allocating foreign resource inflows between sectors
is likely to change the growth impact of investments. Favourable
growth effects of the promotion of heavy industries, for example,
may materialize with considerable delay at best. The ranking of
the growth effects as given in equation (1) is thus likely to be
affected by the degree and nature of interventions concerning the
transfer of foreign resources. Against this background, the ana-
lysis proceeds by evaluating government regulations which in-
fluenced capital inflows to Korea in the 1965-1986 period.
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2. Changes in the Regulative Framework
The Korean policies towards fdi in the 1960s and 1970s can be
characterized by three main features. First, fdi policies were
selective with respect to both the nationality of foreign inves-
tors and the sectors designated for investment. In 1966 and 1973
the fear of a surge of Japanese investment was the reason to make
regulations more restrictive (Lee, 1987, p. 19; Kim, 1976, p.
384) . The heavy industrialization strategy of the 1973-^1979 peri-
od had as a consequence that sector-specific discriminations
became more pronounced. Secondly, a stop-and-go attitude pre-
vailed, as reflected in frequent changes in the regulative frame-
work. Restrictive policies were relaxed whenever the country
experienced foreign exchange problems, e.g. in 1974 after the
first oil price shock, and re-introduced afterwards. Thirdly,
minority-owned joint ventures were favoured with only few excep-
tions. Small-scale investments were ruled out. All these factors
were likely to weaken the growth impact of fdi in Korea.
The restrictive fdi regulations were not effectively enforced
before 1973, which was due to the lack of administrative capa-
bilities and the need for foreign exchange. The new Foreign Capi-
tal Inducement Act (FCIA) of 1973 provided a major change in this
respect (Lee, 1987, pp. 19ff.). The act introduced criteria which
rendered the following projects ineligible to foreign investors:
- projects that would solely aim at providing support for exist-
ing firms;
- projects that would solely aim at profiting from land use;
- projects that would disrupt domestic demand and supply of raw
materials and intermediate products;
- projects that would compete in overseas markets with domestic
firms.
Especially the last two criteria indicate that the Korean author-
ities relied on domestic investors whenever possible. The arti-
- 10 -
ficial reduction of competitive pressure is likely to have nega-
tively affected the efficiency of investments and therefore econ-
omic growth. Moreover, the eligibility criteria were sufficiently
unclear so that all or no foreign direct investment could be
approved, although a positive list of sectors open to foreign
direct investment existed. The restrictive approval procedure and
the uncertainty about its outcome caused considerable costs for
potential foreign investors. Consequently, fdi inflows kept very
low compared with debt inflows until 1984.
The Foreign Capital Inducement Act provided the major instrument
to allocate fdi to priority sectors designated by the government.
The promotion of heavy and chemical industries in the 1973-1979
period is reflected in Table A8 showing the industrial compositi-
on of fdi. Comparing 1972-1976 with 1977-1981, the share of heavy
industries and chemicals in total fdi in manufacturing rose from
54.5 to 61.7 per cent; the share of the chemical industry jumped
from 9.9 to 30.6 per cent. On the other hand, the sharp decline
in the share of textiles from 21 to 0.4 per cent is particularly
noteworthy.
The allocation of fdi to heavy industries is likely to have fur-
ther reduced the growth impact of fdi in the short run. At least
some of the priority sectors did not conform to Korea's compara-
tive advantages. Especially the chemical industry belonged to the
group of highly skill and technology-intensive sectors and ex-
perienced significantly lower gross rates of return on capital
than the average of manufacturing industries (Hong/Park, 1986, p.
169) . A favourable growth impact of fdi in heavy industries can
be expected to materialize with considerable delay only. The
efficiency of fdi may be affected by the strong preference of the
Korean government for large-scale investments and minority-owned
joint ventures as well. Small-scale investments were prohibited
Calculated by subtracting food, textiles and others from total
manufacturing.
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or discriminated although they may be particularly efficient. The
inability of foreign investors with minority stakes to control
the use of their funds may have rendered them reluctant to trans-
fer productivity-increasing technologies.
Entrance barriers for fdi were very high in Korea. Once approved,
however, considerable tax concessions were granted. Both domestic
and foreign investors could choose one of the following three
alternative tax incentives when engaged in heavy and chemical
industries:
- exemption of corporate taxes for three years and a reduction to
50 per cent in the following two years;
- tax credits;
- accelerated depreciation allowances.
An additional incentive scheme was available for foreign inves-
tors exclusively. They benefitted from tax exemptions of several
income and property taxes for five years and a reduction of these
taxes to 50 per cent for the following three years. Consequently,
the tax incentives discriminated not only between industries but
privileged foreign against domestic investors as well.
Moreover, import protection was reinforced during the period of
heavy industrialization. The proportion of items which could be
imported without prior government approval declined from 61.7 per
cent in 1968 to 50.5 per cent in 1976. This development was even
more pronounced in the machinery industry (including the so-
called strategic industries) where the import liberalization
ratio declined from 55.9 per cent to 35.4 per cent in the same
period (Koo, 1984b, p. 12).
Two effects can be expected from subsidization and import protec-
tion. First, the incentives for an efficient use of investment
funds were weakened. Since subsidies were higher for foreign
- 12 -
investors, the efficiency of fdi is likely to be affected in the
first place. Secondly, the privileged treatment of foreign inves-
tors may have led to a crowding out of domestic investors. This
tendency was reinforced by the fact that capital-intensive fdi
projects absorbed domestic and foreign savings available to the
economy. Consequently, the overall investment response of fdi may
be lower than suggested by the agent-principal model.
Only recently the government changed its restrictive and selec-
tive policy towards fdi gradually. The re-orientation in overall
industrialization policies in 1980 is reflected in the revision
of the FCIA in 1984 (Koo, 1984b, pp. 30-33) . A negative list of
projects not eligible to foreign investment was introduced. As
shown in Table A3, 69 per cent of all sectors and 8 6.3 per cent
of manufacturing industries were now open to fdi. This represents
a substantial liberalization compared to the former positive
list. Projects not on the negative list were approved automati-
cally if they met criteria referring to ownership, investment
amount and tax exemptions asked for. This lowered uncertainty and
entry costs substantially. Increasing fdi inflows were recorded
following the policy change. This increase occurred although
general tax exemptions were abolished (Ministry of Finance, 1987,
pp. 18f.) and discriminations between industries and investors
were reduced.
However, the recent changes in policies towards fdi are unlikely
to affect the empirical results in the following section. Hence,
government regulations are supposed to have lowered the overall
investment and growth impact of fdi in the period under consider-
ation.
Foreign loans accounted for the bulk of foreign capital flows to
Korea throughout the 1967-1985 period. Foreign borrowing had to
be approved by the Economic Planning Board. Guarantees for repay-
ment were available since 1962 (Park, 1986, p. 1026). They were
issued to the lender by the Bank of Korea after the approval.
B i b l i o t h e k
_ 13 _ des Instituts fur Weltwirtschaft
Since 1966, the (government owned) commercial banks played a
significant role in issuing payment guarantees as well (Park,
1984, p. 28). Guarantees were taken up in 1971 when the domestic
cost of external borrowing jumped up due to a major depreciation
of the Won. The government bailed out highly indebted firms
facing severe short-term financial problems (Park, 1986, p.
1028) , thereby contributing to the credibility of public guaran-
tees. Two effects were to be expected from this experience.
First, repayment guarantees gave rise to moral hazard of borro-
wers. Since they were less responsible for the repayment of bor-
rowed funds, a tendency towards excessive risk-taking was to be
expected (Oum, 1988, p. 11). Secondly, the incentives of foreign
lenders and domestic intermediaries (i.e., Korean banks) to pro-
perly evaluate the credit risks were weakened. This is because
foreign lenders were payed by the government in the case of
credit failure. The Korean banks could not be made responsible
because they issued the guarantee on government instruction.
Public guarantees contributed to the subsidization of domestic
users of foreign loans because the risks of repayment were arti-
ficially reduced. The attractiveness of foreign credits was fur-
ther strengthened by negative real costs of borrowing during
1966-1980. Real private costs of borrowing abroad averaged -5.9
per cent in 1976-1980 (Table A4). The inflation rate during this
period amounted to 20.7 per cent per annum, while the exchange
rate depreciated by only 5.5 per cent. The overvaluation of the
Won and the inherent subsidization of foreign borrowing (Park,
1986, p. 1025) encouraged inefficient uses of funds, e.g. the
set-up of overcapacities. Between 1975 and 1980, capacity utili-
zation was less than 70 per cent in non-ferrous metal manu-
facturing and less than 40 per cent in transportation equipment
industries (Koo, 1988, p. 11).
As in the case of fdi, foreign loans were mainly attracted to
promote heavy industrialization in the 1970s. The approval pro-
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cedure resulted in an increasing share of heavy and chemical
industries in total foreign borrowing ^1966-1970: 22.7 per cent;
1976-1980: 30.8 per cent; for details see Table A7). Consequent-
ly, the short-term economic growth effects of debt inflows were
likely to be negatively affected as well . Moreover, it is note-
worthy that social overhead projects absorbed roughly one third
of total foreign loans during 1966-1980 and more than half in
1981/82. As in the case of heavy industries, favourable growth
effects of these investments are to be expected in the longer run
at best.
The privileged status of priority industries with respect to
access to loans and cost of borrowing was not restricted to
foreign credits, but applied to domestic loans as well. The sub-
sidization of domestic credits amounted to an average of 10 per
cent of GNP in the 1970s (Hong/Park, 1986, p. 168). Taken domes-
tic and foreign funds together, the government controlled more
than 50 per cent of the financial needs of the corporate business
sector during the 1965-1979 period (Table A6) . Since foreign and
domestic credits were fungible and a substantial part of foreign
funds was channelled through the national banking system, the
regression parameters for the external debt variable in Section
IV may also carry the impact of domestic credits. The coeffici-
ents may be affected as well if borrowers enjoying preferential
access to credits engaged in on-lending to sectors which were
2
discriminated by the government's allocation of loans . The nega-
tive effect of government regulations on the efficiency of in-
Again similar to fdi, the allocation of foreign loans favoured
large firms. This is reflected in higher ratios between exter-
nal funds (including foreign credits) and total assets, as
compared to small firms. The difference peaked at 21.2 percent-
age points in 1974 (Table A2) . As argued before, competition
and therefore efficiency may be reduced due to this discrimina-
tion.
2
This implies that the government's control on the ultimate use
of funds was not as strict as was assumed in the preceding
paragraphs.
- 15 -
vestments might then be softened. Actually, credits were found to
be fungible between the officially promoted heavy industries and
non-priority sectors in the 1970s (Hong/Park, 1986, pp. 172-180).
Nevertheless the proposition can be maintained that public loan
allocation affected the productivity of investments negatively.
The capital market in Korea continued to be strongly segmented
even if discriminations were reduced by on-lending. Table A2
shows that priority sectors (heavy and chemical industries as
well as export oriented industries) experienced significantly
higher ratios of total (domestic and foreign) loans over total
assets as well as significantly lower capital costs than light
and domestic market-oriented industries. Moreover, negative real
interest rates on bank loans sharply contrasted with real inter-
est rates of more than 20 per cent in the unorganized curb market
(Table A4).
Only since 1980 credit policies changed gradually. Five large
state-owned commercial banks were sold to the public. This was
supposed to strengthen management responsibility (Collins/Park,
1987b, p. 14), although the government's leverage on commercial
banks continued to be high. Interest rates remained officially
regulated. However, the access to and the costs of borrowing
became more equal across industries (Tables A2 and A5). In 1982
preferential interest rates were abolished for export-oriented
industries for example. Moreover, in sharp contrast to the 1970s,
real interest rates were positive since 1981. This was due to the
reduction in inflation rates from an average of 20.7 per cent per
annum in 1976-1980 to 9.8 per cent in 1981-1983 and a simulta-
neous rise in exchange rate depreciation from 5.5 per cent to
10 per cent (Table A4).
The government's re-orientation in foreign debt policies is
clearly reflected by the mid-period adjustment of the Fifth Five-
Year Plan in 1982 (Park, 1986, pp. 1038-1040). The priority of
high and increased investments was maintained; but investments
were to be financed out of domestic savings rather than foreign
- 16 -
debt. A current account surplus was planned for 1987. Actual
performance even surpassed the ambitious plan (Table Al) . The
investment ratio exceeded 30 per cent and domestic savings in-
creased steadily. In 1986 Korea experienced a current account
surplus which was as high as the deficit in 1981. The recent
developments have to be considered in the following section since
they are likely to affect the empirical estimations. The success-
ful mobilization of domestic resources and the focus on reducing
foreign indebtedness can be expected to result in negative co-
efficients for debt inflows in the 1981-1986 period, especially
in the case of the investment and savings equations.
IV. The Structure of External Financing and Economic Performance
1. Specification of Hypotheses
The hypotheses on the economic performance effects of cooperative
transfer negotiations and government regulations affecting capi-
tal inflows in the case of Korea are subjected to empirical tests
in the following. Using annual observations, the following basic
equation is estimated for the 1965-1986 period:
(3) X = a Q + a1 FDI + a 2 AID + a, DEBT
The endogenous variables to be explained in separate regressions
are the investment ratio (I), the domestic savings ratio (DS) and
real annual growth of GDP (GR). The set of explanatory variables
includes foreign direct investment flows to Korea, aid, and total
debt inflows.
According to the theoretical framework outlined above, a coopera-
tive equilibrium suggests the following pattern of coefficients:
(4) a 1 £ a 2 £ a 3.
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In addition, individual coefficients should satisfy the following
constraints:
(5) a) -1 £ a_ £ 0 when the endogenous variable is DS,
b) 0 £ a~ 2 1 when the endogenous variable is I,
c) a_ S 0 when the endogenous variable is GR.
Multiple regression analysis is applied to test whether or not
the constraints have to be rejected. Additionally, F-tests are
employed to test the competing hypothesis that different types of
capital inflows do not have a statistically different impact on
the endogenous variables:
(6) ax = a2 = a3.
The importance of discriminating among capital inflows will be
evaluated by making pair-wise comparisons:
(7) a) ax = a 2
b) ax = a3
c) a 2 = a 3
Restriction (7a) is the crucial one for determining the type of
equilibrium. While a cooperative equilibrium is characterized by
a- S a 2, a non-cooperative equilibrium is characterized by a^
In additional estimations, debt inflows are differentiated ac-
cording to the maturity of credits, the type of borrower, and the
type of lender. Long-term debt (DEBT-L) is expected to have a
more favourable impact on economic performance than short-term
debt (DEBT-S) if the latter is mainly raised to cover temporary
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operating deficits of the government and the business sector.
Private agents are supposed to use debt inflows (DEBT-Pr) more
productively than government agencies (DEBT-Gv). The growth im-
pact of credits provided by private sources (DEBT-Ba) is expected
to be larger than the impact of credits from official sources
(DEBT-Mu) since the concessionality of the latter may weaken the
incentives to use external funds productively. The equations to
be estimated are then:
(8) x = b Q + b1 FDI +' b 2 AID + b 3 DEBT-L + b^ DEBT-S
(9) x = cQ + c 1 FDI + c 2 AID + c 3 DEBT-Gv + c^ DEBT-Pr
(10) x = dQ + d1 FDI + d 2 AID + d3 DEBT-Mu + d 4 DEBT-Ba
2. The Data Base and Methodological Remarks
The main data sources were balance of payments and national
accounts statistics. A detailed description of the variables is
presented in Appendix 1. Most of the data covered the 1965-1986
period. Data on lending by official and private creditors was
only available since 1967.
All equations were estimated using the ordinary-least-squares
technique. The Cochrane-Orcutt procedure was applied if results
were biased by first-order autocorrelation of the residuals. The
figures for the explaining capital inflow variables were stan-
dardized by expressing them as percentages of gross national
product (GNP). A trend variable (T) was included optionally as a
proxy to capture the effects of neglected variables which may not
be readily incorporated into the underlying agent-principal
model.
Two additional factors had to be taken into account which may
lead to biased results otherwise:
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- As argued in the preceding section, Korean policies towards
external debt changed dramatically since 1981. This was likely
to affect the relationship between debt inflows and economic
performance variables. The coefficients of debt may be distor-
ted if calculated for the whole period 1965-1986, i.e., ne-
glecting the structural break in 1981.
- Distortions may also arise from short-term effects of the two
oil price shocks which caused economic growth and domestic
savings to decline temporarily. Simultaneously, soaring current
account deficits in 1974/75 and 1979/80 were financed by addit-
ional debt inflows in order to keep investments high and sus-
tain imports (Park, 1986, p. 1030). Lower economic growth and
domestic savings went along with higher inflows of short-term
debt, private debt, and loans from commercial sources partic-
ularly.
Dummy variables were included in the regressions in order to
account for these factors. With regard to the re-orientation in
debt policies, the slope dummy Dl was introduced for total debt
inflows in 1981-1986. The effects of the oil price shocks on
savings and growth were captured by slope dummies for DEBT (D2) ,
DEBT-S (DS2), DEBT-Pr (DPR2), and DEBT-Ba (DBA2) for the years
1974/75 and 1979/80.
3. Empirical Results
The estimates of equations (3) presented in Table 1 support the
reasoning on the importance of government regulations in influ-
encing the economic performance effects of capital inflows in the
case of Korea. As was to be expected, the investment equations
reveal a significantly positive impact of debt. However, the
relationship between debt inflows and the investment ratio became
negative in the 1980s. This is reflected by the negative coeffic-
ient of the dummy variable Dl, which captures the recent change
in Korean policies towards external debt. Korea succeeded to
Table 1: Impact of Capital Inflows on Investment, Savings, and Growth in Korea, 1965-1986
Endogenous
variables
Ia
I
DS
DS
GR
GR
Const.
ao
30.59***
(6.63)
15.59***
(3.10)
30.21***
(23.49)
16.56**
(2.63)
9.31***
(4.57)
18.11
(1.61)
FDI
al
0.37
(0.16)
-3.18
(-1.20)
-7.40***
(-2.94)
-3.27
(-1.11)
0.30
(0.07)
-2.36
(-0.45)
AID
a2
1.19
(0.47)
0.27
(0.23)
-5.17***
(-10.00)
-2.34
(-1.72)
-0.64
(-0.78)
-2.46
(-1.01)
DEBT
a3
0.34*
(1.96)
0.47**
(2.32)
-0.58***
(-2.96)
0.03
(0.10)
0.32
(1.02)
-0.08
(-0.13)
Dl
a4
-0.42*
(-2.06)
-0.39*
(-1.79)
-0.63**
(-2.22)
-0.98***
(-3.26)
-0.77
(-1.69)
-0.54
(-1.02)
D2
a5
-
-
-0.14
(-0.69)
-0.37*
(-1.79)
-0.83**
(-2.62)
-0.67*
(-1.82)
T
a6
-
0.79***
(3.40)
-
0.65**
(2.20)
-
-0.42
(-0.80)
R2(R2)
0.84(0.81)
0.87(0.83)
0.90(0.87)
0.92(0.89)
0.38(0.18)
0.40(0.16)
DW
1.33
1.31
1.82
1.95
2.15
2.21
i
to
O
1
For the definition of variables, see the text and the Appendix.
a
 Corrected for first-order autocorrelation of the residuals. - t-values in parentheses. - * Significant at the 10%-level. -
** Significant at the 5%-level.
_ *** Significant at the 1%-level.
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Yearbook, various issues; Economic Planning Board (1987); Bank of Korea (1984); OECD, Geo-
graphical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, various issues; own calculations.
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maintain or even increase high investments although further debt
inflows were strongly discouraged. A negative relationship was
thus to be expected for the recent past.
In contrast to debt, the coefficients of aid and fdi remain in-
significant in the investment equations (Table 1). This is mainly
due to the minor role of these types of capital inflows in the
external financing of Korea. The countrys no longer benefitted
from substantial amounts of foreign aid since the late 1960s; and
government policies towards fdi were restrictive over much of the
period under consideration. Additionally, the privileged treat-
ment of approved fdi in the 1970s is responsible for the insig-
nificant coefficients of fdi to the extent that it induced a
crowding out of domestic investors.
The relevance of government .regulations is also evident from the
insignificant coefficients of all types of resource inflows in
the growth equation. The efficiency of investments was negatively
affected by the following factors particularly:
- public repayment guarantees;
- negative real costs of foreign borrowing;
- the allocation of loans and fdi to large-scale enterprises in
heavy and chemical industries;
- the preference on joint ventures with minority stakes of for-
eign investors.
The relationship between capital inflows and domestic savings in
Korea should be interpreted with considerable caution. The sig-
nificantly negative coefficients in the first savings equation
are probably due to mis-specification. In contrast to the invest-
ment and growth equations, the results are strongly affected if
the trend variable T was included as a proxy for neglected vari-
ables. Taking T into account, all capital inflow variables are
rendered insignificant. This result is in line with a recent
study on the determinants of domestic savings in Korea which
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found foreign savings to be insignificant in the 1965-1981 period
(Yusuf/Peters, 1984, p. 21) . Arguably the single-equation ordi-
nary least squares technique applied is inadequate for the
savings equation because of simultaneous equation problems. In
the case of Korea, high and stable investments were of first
priority. Foreign capital inflows, especially foreign loans, were
treated as a residual filling the gap between desired investment
and available domestic savings. Consequently, foreign capital
inflows were not fully exogenous.
Due to the small volume of aid and fdi inflows and the impact of
government regulations it proved difficult to test the hypothesis
that Korea provides an example of cooperative agent-principal
relations. Table 2 presents F-tests confronting the restricted
versions of equations (3) with the unrestricted versions of Table
1. The comparison between a., and a_ is the crucial one for de-
termining the type of equilibrium reached in transfer negotiati-
ons. Table 2 indicates that a., is not significantly different
from a2 so that neither the hypothesis of cooperative relations
nor the counter-hypothesis of non-rcooperative relations can be
rejected. Moreover, all three capital inflow variables do not
show any significant differences in their investment and growth
impact. The strict control of the inflow and usage of foreign
funds by the Korean government and particularly the similar set
of regulations governing debt and fdi equalized the economic
performance effects of different sources of external finance.
Basically, the aforementioned conclusions can be maintained if
debt inflows are differentiated according to the maturity of
loans and the type of borrowers and lenders (Table 3). With only
two exceptions, the coefficients of fdi and aid remain insignifi-
The same study identified overall economic growth, the infla-
tion rate and real interest rates as the most important de-
terminants of domestic savings.
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Table 2: Constraint Tests
Endogenous
variables
a l
fa
 
II
fa
 
II
fa
 
II
= a 2 = a 3
(2,16)
0.05
(2,16)
28.64*
(2,16)
0.54
a
F
F
F
1 = a 2
(1,16)
0.07
(1,16)
0.84
(1,16)
0.06
a
F
F
F
1 a 3
(1,16)
0.01
(1,16)
7.16*
(1,16)
0.02
E-02
E-03
a
F
F
F
2 = a 3
(1,16)
0.9
(1,16)
57.10*
(1,16)
0.99
DS
GR
For the estimated equations, see Table 1 and the text. The re-
sults are based on the equations without trend variable. The
results remain the same when T is included, except for the
savings equation. * Significant at the 5% level.
Source: See Table 1.
cant . The government's leverage in determining the use and thus
the efficiency of debt inflows is most evident from Section B of
Table 3. In contrast to foreign loans directly raised by the
public sector, the impact of private sector loans on overall
investment is positive, although significant slightly above the
10 per cent level only. However, the F-test reveals that the
investment responses of DEBT-Gv and DEBT-Pr fail to be signifi-
cantly different (Table A10). Moreover, the growth impact of both
debt variables remains completely insignificant, as was the case
for total debt.
The exceptions refer to the negative coefficients of fdi (in
the investment equation) and aid (in the savings equation) when
debt is differentiated according to the type of creditor. The
former result is totally implausible in economic terms; the
same applies to the negative coefficient of debt from official
sources (DEBT-Mu) in the same equation. These results may be
partly due to data problems. DEBT-Mu and DEBT-Ba were only
available since 1967 so that regressions had to be run on a
reduced number of observations. Moreover, from the insignifi-
cance of the trend variable it appears that mis-specification
of the equation could not be avoided in Section C of Table 3 by
considering T as a proxy of neglected variables; in contrast to
Section C, T is highly significant in both the investment and
savings equations when debt is differentiated with regard to
maturity and type of borrower.
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Table 3: The Structure of External Financing and Economic Performance in Korea : The Impact of the Maturity of
Debt and the Type of Borrowers and Creditors, 1965-1986
Endogenous Const. FDI AID DEBT-L
variables b Q b^ b_ b^
DEBT-S Dl
b5
D2 DS2 R2
(R2)
DW
A. Maturity of debt
DS
GR
GR
9.44
(1.64)
10.93*
(1.90)
8.57***
(4.56)
9.18***
(5.06)
-2.19
(-0.86)
-2.49
(-0.99)
-0.69
(-0.19)
-1.37
(-0.40)
1.17
(0.98)
-1.54
(-1.28)
-1.03
(-1.35)
-1.08
(-1.51)
1.08**
(2.85) .
0.67
(1.75)
0.94**
(2.31)
0.77*
(1.92)
0.18
(0.74)
-0.69
(-1.31)
-1.33
(-1.61)
-0.46
(-0.50)
-0.57**
(-2.54)
-1.04***
(-3.93)
-0.60
(-1.43)
-0.82*
(-2.01)
-
-0.20
(-0.50)
-
-0.25
(-0.49)
-
-1.32
(-1.51)
1.08***
(4.05)
0.90***
(3.37)
-
• -
0.90
(0.85)
0.95
(0.92)
0.52
(0.33)
0.58
(0.41)
1.54
1.84
1.99
1.94
B. Type of borrower
Endogenous
variables
Ic
DS
GR
GR
Const.
C0
14.83**
(2.93)
15.59**
(2.50)
8.81***
(4.05)
9.00***
(4.28)
FDI
Cl
-1.66
(-0.73)
-3.69
(-1.21)
-0.76
(-0.18)
-0.55
(-0.13)
AID
C2
1.97
(1.24)
-2.05
(-1.51)
-0.29
(-0.31)
-0.49
(-0.53)
DEBT-Gv
C3
-0.03
(-0.06)
0.53
(0.75)
1.17
(0.97)
0.91
(0.76)
DEBT-Pr
C4
0.37
(1.75)
-0.02
(-0.05)
0.11
(0.27)
0.23
(0.56)
Dl
C5
-0.21
(-0.89)
-1.07***
(-3.55)
-0.86*
(-1.80)
-0.87*
(-1.91)
D2
C6
-
-0.72*
(-2.06)
-
DPR2
C7
-0.43
(-1.59)
-
-0.98**
(-2.39)
T
C8
0.85***
(3.43)
0.69**
(2.33)
-
-
R2
<R2)
0.89
(0.84)
0.93
(0.90)
0.40
(0.16)
0.44
(0.22)
DW
1.48
1.83
2.03
1.96
C. Type of creditor
Endogenous
variables
Ic
DS
GR
GR
Const.
d0
28.54***
(5.48)
21.02***
(3.24)
8.26**
(2.75)
8.28**
(2.64)
a
 For the definition
per cent level; ** 5
type of creditors. -
FDI
-4.92**
(-2.30)
-1.78
(-0.64)
-0.75
(-0.15)
-0.86
(-0.16)
AID
0.43
(0.19)
-4.14**
(-2.51)
-1.29
(-0.81)
-1.15
(-0.70)
DEBT-Mu
d3
-1.52**
(-2.72)
-0.99
(-1.12)
0.97
(0.94)
0.95
(0.88)
DEBT-Ba
d4
0.09
(0.29)
0.69
(1.46)
0.57
(0.64)
0.50
(0.53)
Dl
-0.19
(-0.85)
-1.15**'
(-3.98)
-0.88
(-1.61)
-0.84
(-1.46)
D2 DBA2
d6 *7
-
' -0.49***
(-3.21)
-0.73**
(-2.59)
-1.98**
(-2.28)
T
0.
(0.
0.
(1.
.23
.91)
.38
.32)
R 2
(R2)
0.90
(0.84)
0.92
(0.87)
0.40
(0.13)
0.35
(0.06)
of variables, see the text and the Appendix, t-values in parentheses; * significant at
ger cent level; *** 1 per cent level. - 1967-1986 for the differentiation with regard
Corrected for first-order autocorrelation of the residuals.
DW
1.49
2.15
2.07
2.17
the 10
to the
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Yearbook, various issues; Economic Planning Board (1987); Bank of Korea (1984);
OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, various issues; World Bank,
World Debt Tables, various issues; own calculations.
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The positive impact of debt inflows on the investment ratio is
mainly due to long-term credits (DEBT-L). The results reported in
Section A of Table 3 indicate that short-term debt (DEBT-S) was
largely used to maintain planned investments when the domestical-
ly available resources were insufficient. Furthermore, long-term
debt had a positive impact on economic growth, whereas the co-
efficients of DEBT-S are (insignificantly) negative. The latter
result is noteworthy because the effects of the oil price shocks
are captured by the dummy variables D2 and DS2 and should, there-
fore, not influence the coefficients of DEBT-S. Nevertheless,
there is only weak support for the hypothesis that long-term debt
was used more efficiently than short-term loans. As in all other
growth equations, the differences between DEBT-L and DEBT-S are
shown to be insignificant by the constraint tests presented in
Table A9. This again points to the role of government regulations
in equalizing the efficiency and productivity of different re-
source inflows.
V. Summary and Conclusions
It was the principal aim of this paper to identify empirically
the effects of fdi, debt and aid inflows on investment, domestic
savings and economic growth. According to the underlying model on
international transfer negotiations, Korea was considered as an
example of cooperative agent-principal relations. Consequently,
the investment and growth responses of both fdi and debt inflows
were supposed to be stronger than in the case of aid. The coun-
ter-hypothesis of non-cooperative agent-principal relations
claimed that the economic performance effects of fdi were smaller
than the impact of aid.
Neither of these hypotheses could be rejected with much confi-
dence by the empirical estimates. This was partly due to the fact
that fdi and aid played only a marginal role in the external
financing of Korea. In the case of fdi, this was caused by the
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restrictive approval procedure of Korean authorities. Generally,
the economic performance effects of resource inflows were strong-
ly influenced by the institutional framework governing these
inflows and government regulations affecting the use of foreign
funds. This is in line with the proposition on the dominant role
of the government in determining the efficiency of capital in-
flows in Korea.
A high investment ratio was of first priority for the Korean
government throughout the whole period under consideration. More-
over, efforts were intensified to mobilize domestic investment
funds, as reflected in the secular rise of the savings ratio.
Foreign capital inflows were regarded as a source to fill the gap
between desired investment and domestically available resources
in the first place. The government heavily intervened into the
allocation of debt and fdi inflows, especially by tightly regu-
lating financial markets. Preferential access to foreign finance
and the subsidization of these funds represented crucially im-
portant measures in this respect.
Especially during the 1973-1979 period, the bulk of foreign funds
were channelled to large-scale enterprises operating in heavy and
chemical industries. The focus on heavy industrialization dimin-
ished the growth impact of capital inflows in the short run at
least. The incentives to use foreign funds efficiently were fur-
ther weakened in various ways. In the case of fdi, the officially
favoured minority participation of overseas investors in joint
ventures, the selective and discriminatory approval system, stop-
and-go attitudes in its application, and - once approved - the
preferential tax treatment of foreign over domestic investors
were noteworthy. Tax privileges even gave rise to a crowding out
of domestic investments. In the case of debt, publicly issued
repayment guarantees rendered it dispensable for both the credi-
tor banks and capital recipients to carefully evaluate the pro-
ductivity of investment projects. Moreover, real costs of bor-
rowing abroad were negative until the 1980s.
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All in all, government interventions can be blamed for having im-
paired the efficiency of foreign resource inflows. The effects of
different types of resource inflows on economic growth were
equalized since fdi and debt were governed by a similar set of
regulations. However, economic growth of Korea continued to be
high in international perspective due to the high investment
ratio and successful mobilization of domestic savings. Apparent-
ly, foreign creditors were confident that the country was pre-
pared to engage in cooperative agent-principal relations. This is
indicated by the fact that loans were easily available for Korea
in international financial markets at rapidly improving conditi-
ons .
The costs of official credit allocation and subsidization became
evident in the early 1980s only, when Korea experienced a
drastic though temporary setback in economic growth. The authori-
ties recognized that the favourable economic performance was
difficult to sustain if the subsidization of heavy industries was
to be continued.
The subsequent policy re-orientation involved the revision of
debt and fdi policies. Real costs of foreign borrowing became
positive. Recently, further debt inflows were strongly dis-
couraged by the government; outstanding debt has been reduced
since 1986. On the other hand, the restrictive attitude towards
fdi has been liberalized. The engagement of foreign investors in
Korea was encouraged by implementing an automatic approval system
and introducing a negative list of industries reserved for domes-
tic investors which has been reduced annually.
Two major effects are to be expected from these policy changes.
First, the external financing structure of Korea will shift
towards the pattern considered as optimal by the agent-principal
model under cooperative transfer conditions. Given risk-averse
agents and cooperative transfer relations, the agent should pre-
fer fdi over debt inflows. This is because the trade-off between
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economic growth and income stability, characterizing fdi inflows
in the case of non-cooperative agent-principal relations, is
avoided. In other words, the same growth effects can be achieved
with less risk by relying on fdi rather than debt.
Secondly, the policy re-orientation is well-suited to improve the
efficiency of foreign capital inflows. However, additional
measures are required in this respect. Financial 'markets in Korea
remained segmented although interest rate differentials among
industrial sectors were substantially reduced since 1982. In
19 86, curb market rates were more than twice as high as bank
lending rates. The government's leverage on the decision making
of Korean banks continued to be strong, although state-owned
commercial banks were privatized in the 1980s. In order to
strengthen the accountability and managerial responsibility of
financial institutions, the liberalization of interest rate poli-
cies should be intensified and must encompass both lending and
deposit rates. Publicly issued credit guarantees should be
abolished. Only if the banks face sufficiently strong incentives
to carefully assess the profitability of projects investment
funds will be allocated to the most efficient use.
The liberalization program is to be extended to capital markets
in Korea in order to accelerate and facilitate the desirable
shift towards more equity participation and to further improve
the efficiency of capital inflows (for detailed suggestions in
this respect, see Iqbal, 1988a; 1988b). Remaining restrictions
concerning equity participation of foreign investors should be
abolished to widen the potential of risk sharing, to attune the
servicing of foreign obligations to the ability to pay, and to
diversify the sources of external funding. Moreover, the liberal-
ization of capital markets helps to meet the changing lender
preferences, e.g. the current trend towards securitization in
international financial markets. Most importantly, portfolio
investments by overseas investors should be encouraged through
the promotion and reform of the Korean stock market. Currently,
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the engagement of foreigners in Korean capital markets is largely
restricted to indirect forms, especially through the Korea Fund,
i.e. a closed-end investment fund which was offered to the gen-
eral public as well as institutional investors in mid-1984. A
direct engagement of foreign investors in listed Korean securi-
ties should be allowed as soon as possible. The same refers to
the possibility of Korean enterprises to list their shares on
major international stock exchanges and of fer" their shares for
public subscription in the Euro-equity market.
Finally, the empirical analysis of the Korean case suggests poss-
ible ways as to how to elaborate on the underlying agent-prin-
cipal model. Above all, a closer investigation is required with
regard to the institutional framework governing the import and
use of foreign capital and its consequences for the decision-
making process of foreign principals on the terms of capital
transfers. This may help to clarify in which way capital recip-
ients can signal most effectively and credibly that they are
prepared to engage in cooperative agent-principal relations. In
this context, it is necessary to consider agent-principal rela-
tions within the recipient country as well, particularly the
interrelations between the government and the private sector.
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Appendix 1; Definition of Variables
The Balance of Payments Statistics published by the International
Monetary Fund are the source of the following variables:
FDI: Gross foreign direct investment in Korea
DEBT-L: Long-term debt inflows to the resident official sector,
deposit money banks and "other" sectors
DEBT-S: Short-term debt inflows to the resident official sector,
deposit money banks and "other" sectors
DEBT: Sum of long and short-term debt inflows
DEBT-Gv: Government debt is proxied by the sum of net short and
long-term debt flows to the resident official sector
DEBT-Pr: Includes short and long-term debt flows to deposit money
banks and other sectors
The Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing
Countries issued by the OECD provides the data for the aid
variable:
AID: Consists of grants only
In the case of non-guaranteed private debt the available data
allows to discriminate among creditors for some years only. Since
debt from official sources designed to private borrowers is of
negligible size total non-guaranteed private debt is assumed to
originate from private creditors. Debt inflows according to the
type of creditor are taken from the World Debt Tables published
by the World Bank.
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DEBT-Mu: Net inflows of public and publicly guaranteed debt from
official sources
DEBT-Ba: Net debt inflows from private sources include public and
publicly guaranteed credits from suppliers and financial
markets plus non-guaranteed private debt
The figures for the endogenous variables are taken from Economic
Planning Board (1987) and Bank of Korea (1984).
GNP: Gross national product at current market prices
GR: Annual growth rate of real GNP
I: Investment ratio (gross fixed capital formation as per-
cent of GNP)
DS: Savings ratio (domestic savings as percent of GNP)
The following dummy variables are used:
D l _ DEBT for 1981-1986
0 for all other years
D 2 = DEBT for 1974, 1975, 1979, 1980
0 for all other years
D S 2 = DEBT-S for 1974, 1975, 1979, 1980
0 for all other years
DPR2 = D E B T~ pr for 1974, 1975, 1979, 1980
0 for all other years
DBA2 = Debt-Ba for 1974, 1975, 1979, 1980
0 for all other years
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Table Al: Time Series Data for Endogenous and Exogenous Variables, 1965-1986a
Year
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
I
14.8
20.2
21.4
25.0
25.8
24.7
22.5
20.4
23.2
25.6
25.3
24.4
27.3
31.3
33.2
32.3
28.7
30.5
31.3
31.3
30.8
31.3
DS
per cent
7.0
11.1
10.7
14.1
17.6
16.2
14.5
15.7
21.4
19.3
16.8
22.2
25.4
27.3
26.5
20.8
20.5
20.9
25.3
27.9
28.6
32.8
GR
5.8
12.7
6.6
11.3
13.8
7.6
9.1
5.3
14.0
8.5
6.8
13.4
10.7
11.0
7.0
-4.8
6.6
5.4
11.9
8.4
5.4
12.5
FDI
0.0
13.0
11.0
1.0
-3.0
66.0
39.1
63.0
93.0
104.6
53.4
75.0
72.4
61.3
36.2
7.8
101.4
68.4
69.5
111.7
230.5
428.2
DEBT
US-$ million
1.0
190.0
289.0
475.0
720.0
661.0
744.3
425.6
512.5
1637.9
2411.3
1714.5
1253.8
1993.3
5333.5
5616.8
4574.0
4073.8
2194.7
2425.2
734.2
-4564.8
AID
134.0
122.0
134.0
119.0
102.0
83.0
63.2
49.9
35.8
67.3
66.8
153.6
52.5
36.3
40.1
50.8
80.2
53.0
26.7
25.6
22.3
10.6
a
 For the definition of variables see Appendix 1.
Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, various
issues; Economic Planning Board (1987); The Bank of Korea (1984); own
calculations.
Table A2: Discrimination in Access to and Average Costs of Borrowing between Subgroups
 of ^he Manufacturing Industry, 1972-1984
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Differences Small
in access to - Large firms -18.45 -17.00 -21;20 -13.56 -6.38 -0.59 -2.67 -2.72 -5.46 -4.50 1.61 0.43 2.56
loans (per-
centage points) Domestic-market
oriented
- Export-oriented
firms -2.50 -4.20 -6.85 -8.45 -3.20 -4.23 -5.31 -5.86 -16.90 -12.79 -9.07 -7.44 -6.29
Light industry
- Heavy and chemical
industry -6.91 -0.42 7.79 3.44 -1.27 -2.48 -5.66 -0.28 -2.56 -6.96 -0.68 -0.67 -1.25
Differences Small
in average costs - Large firms 2.18 3.11 0.92 2.73 2.59 1.89 3.64 -0.26 2.32 0.47 -0.70 -0.76 -0.32
of borrowing (per-
centage points) Domestic-market
oriented
- Export-oriented
firms 1.40 0.06 1.06 2.78 0.91 0.37 -0.43 -1.90 5.02 4.55 4.04 1.98 2.29
Light industry
- Heavy and chemical
industry 2.78 2.25 0.21 1.92 3.56 2.79 5.76 4.11 2.47 2.15 1.64 1.70 0.07
Measured as differences in ratios of total bank loans and foreign loans over total assets of each sector. - Measured as differences in interest paid plus dis-
count divided by total borrowing (foreign loans, bonds, etc. included).
Source: Bank of Korea, Financial Statement Analysis, various issues.
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Table A3; Share of Branches Open to Foreign Direct Investment^ 1984
(per cent)
Agriculture, Forestry and
Fishery , 1 2 . 8
Mining 50.0
Manufacturing 86.3
Food and Beverages 59.7
Textiles and Leather 91.5
Wood and Wood Products 88.0
Paper and Paper Products 75.7
Chemicals, Petroleum, Rubber
and Plastic Products 84.7
Non-metallic Mineral Products
Basic Metal Industries 100.0
Fabricated Metal Products,
Machinery and Equipment 90.7
Miscellaneous 96.9
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 50.0
Construction 93.5
Retail and Wholesale Trade,
Restaurants and Hotels 65.2
Transportation, Warehousing and
Communication 19.6
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
and Business Services 34.4
Social and Personal Services 46.2
Others 0
Total 69.0
In per cent of total branches in each sector; calculated on the basis of the
negative list of branches in which fdi is prohibited.
Source: Ministry of Finance (1984).
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Table A4; Cost of Capital, 1966-1986 (period average, per oent)a
Domestic bank lend-
ing rate (nominal)a
Curb market interest
rate (nominal)
1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-83 1984-85 1986
24.4
54.2
7.2
5 . 1
14.6
17.0
40.1
7.9
7 .8
19.8
18.0
41.3
9.3
5 .5
20.7
12.5
30.6
13.3
10.0
9.8
10.0
24.4
9.7
14.8
3.8
10.0
23.1
6.9
-3.0
2.4
Foreign interest rate
(nominal)
Exchange rate de-
preciation
Domestic inflation
rate (GDP deflator)
Interest rate differ-
ential between home,
and foreign markets 12.1 1.3 3.2 -10.9 -14.5 6.1
Real private cost of
borrowing abroade -2.3 -4.1 -5.9 13.6 20.7 1.5
Discounts on bills of deposit money banks. - Ninety-day LIBOR (London
interbank offered rate). - Bank of Korea standard concentration rate.-
Canputed as domestic bank lending rate minus foreign interest rate minus
exchange rate depreciation. - e Computed as foreign interest rate plus
exchange rate depreciation minus domestic inflation rate.
Source: Collins/Park (1987b, Table 3.6).
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Table A5; Cost of Bank Lending for Manufacturing Industries,
1970-1984a
Year Average
(per cent)
Variance
(percentage points)
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
17.92
18.40
15.05
11.49
12.47
13.59
14.58
15.16
15.52
17.17
20.47
19.50
16.89
14.33
14.46
83.18
55.73
43.14
14.38
17.56
15.60
16.13
18.95
14.50
21.44
20.99
13.20
8.33
8.05
5.91
Based on data for 68 industries according to the 4-digit code
classification of Korea Standard Industry Classification (KSIC).
Source: Cho/Cole (1986, p. 32).
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Table A6: Structure of Borrowed Funds of Corporate Business Sector, 1965-1984a
1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84
(per cent of total)
Indirect Financing
Banks
Non-banks
Government Loans
Direct Financing
Foreign Debt
Total
thereof:
Government-Controlled
Financing
47.4
37.5
9.9
-
14.6
37.9
100.0
75.4
55.9
40.4
15.0
0.5
20.8
23.3
100.0
64.2
56.5
35.9
20.6
0.1
23.0
20.4
100.0
56.4
53.0
23.8
26.4
2.8
41.0
6.0
100.0
32.6
Averages of flows. Non-corporate enterprises and government enterprises are
included since 1980. - Includes stocks, bonds, and conmercial papers. -
Includes banks, government loans, and foreign debt.
Source: Bank of Korea (1985a).
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Table A7: Foreign Loans by Destination, 1966-82 (per cent of total)
Agriculture, Forestry
and Fisheries
Mining
Manufacturing industries
Heavy and chemicals
Light industries
Social Overhead
Services
Other
1966-70
11.4
1.0
39.8
(22.7)
(17.1)
39.5
6.5
1.8
1971-75
13.0
-
38.8
(26.3)
(12.5)
29.8
13.4
5.0
1976-80
6.7
0.1
39.4
(30.8)
(8.6)
38.8
14.5
0.3
1981-82
9.2
0.2
15.2
(12.8)
(2.4)
55.5
14.4
5.3
Total (million US$) 1693.2 4523.2 11810.5 5734.1
Source: Collins/Park (1987b, Table 3.11).
Table A8; Industrial Composition of FDI Flows to Korea, 1962-1984 (per cent of total)
Agriculture, Fishery & Mining
Manufacturing
Food
Textiles
Chemicals
Drugs & Pharmaceuticals
Fertilizers
Petroleum
Metal
Machinery
Electric and Electronics
Transportation Equipments
Others
Services
Financing
Hotel and Tourism
Other Services
a
 Jan. to Nov.
1962-1984
1.3
74.6
2.7
8.8
17.8
2.7
2.8
4.0
4.4
7.8
15.9
3.6
4.1
24.1
3.9
12.9
7.3
1962^66
0.5
99.5
0.5
3.8
21.6
1.4
45.9
23.5
0.0
1.4
0.0
0.0
0.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1967^71
1.2
83.1
1.2
13.9
13.1 '
0.7
10.9
10.5
5.5
3.2
11.6
0.3
12.1
15.7
2.7
7.8
5.2
1972V76
1.5
80.1
0.4
21.0
9.9
0.7
3.8
6.1
5.9
6.3
15.3
6.3
4.2
18.6
2.0
13.1
3.5
1977^81
1.4
69.2
2.9
0.4
30.6
0.5
0.3
2.5
4.9
8.2
12.1
2.4
4.2
29.6
5.8
11.2
12.5
1982
1.4
90.8
3.6
3.1
31.7
7.9
0.0
0.7
0.8
10.9
22.4
5.1
4.4
8.2
2.0
4.7
1.5
1983
0.5
67.7
7.3
0.0
4.7
12.1
0.0
0.1
1.7
14.4
24.1
2.4
0.7
32.1
2.1
16.6
13.4
1984a
0.6
60.6
7.5
0.9
4.4
0.7
0.0
0.0
0.1
9.4
26.7
0.0
1.0
38.7
7.8
25.6
5.3
Source: The Bank of Korea (1985b)
Table A9: Contraint Tests: Long-term versus Short-term Debt
Endogenous
variables
I
DSa
GRb
GRa
b, = b 2 = b 3
F(3,15)
= 2.23
F(3,15)
= 2.91
F(3,15)
= 1.94
F(3,15)
= 1.31
= b4 b 1 = b 2
= 3'.00
F(lf15)
= 0.24
= 0.09E-01
= 0.07E-01
= l!89
= l!78
= o!l9
= o!37
bl = b4
= o'.92
= o'.52
= o!o3
= o'.O6
= 0.08E-01
= 5!04*
= 3^4
= 3#.92
b 2 = b4
= o!74
= o'.51
= o'.O8
= o!33
b3 = b4
= 3^2
= 3!84
= 4'.51
= l!09
For the estimated equations see Table 3, Section A and the text. - * Significant at the 5 per cent level. - In-
cluding DS2. - Including D2.
Source: See Table 3.
Table A10: Contraint Tests: Government versus Private Debt
Endogenous
variables c, = co = c, = cA c, = c, c, = c, cn = cA c, = c, c 2 = c. c- = c.cl C2 C3
F(3,15)
= 1.14
F(3,15)
= 1.51
= C4 Cl =
= 2.
= o!
C2
48
43
Cl 
= o!
— i
C3
51
77
Cl
= o!
= i!
C4
86
15)
66
C2
= I!
= 4!
:C3
52
48
= 1.02 = 0.53
DS a
= 2.97 = 0.45
h
GR F(3,15) F(l,15) F(l,15) F(l,15) F(l,15) F(l,15) F(l,15)
= 0.53 = 0.01 = 0.16 = 0.04 = 1.50 = 0.11 = 0.54
GR F(3,15) F(l,15) F(l,15) F(l,15) F(l,15) F(l,15) F(l,15)
= 0.55 = 0.02E-02 = 0.10 = 0.04 = 1.49 = 0.36 = 0.22
a
 For the estimated equations see Table 3, Section B and the text. - * Significant at the 5 per cent level. - a In-
cluding DPR2. - Including D2. - Corrected for first order autocorrelation of the residuals.
Source: See Table 3.
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